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TAX FORUM
DORIS L. BOSWORTH, CPA, Editor
PAYROLL TAX SAVINGS—SICK PAY
If the employer has a definite plan for 
payment of wages during periods when em­
ployees are absent from work due to sickness 
or accident, these wages are exempt from 
social security taxes, including Medicare and 
Federal unemployment tax. Unlike the income 
tax sick pay exclusion, there is no dollar 
ceiling or waiting period, the exclusion apply­
ing to all sick pay. The plan must be in writ­
ing, or otherwise made known to the employ­
ees, and must cover all employees or a specified 
group of employees.
All employers who have a large number of 
employees earning less than the various pay­
roll tax maxima can save payroll taxes through 
the exclusion of “sick pay.” The following 
example illustrates how this tax saving might 
work out in dollars and cents. In 1966, you 
have 100 employees earning less than $6,600 
annually (all employees who earn more than 
$6,600 annually in excess of sick pay would 
have no savings). It is company policy to pay 
them in full for the time they are out on 
account of sickness or accident. These 100 
employees are out sick on an average of 
three days a year and have average earnings of 
$100.00 a week. 100 employees times three 
sick days equals 300 sick days divided by 5 
equals 60 weeks times 100 equals $6,000 sick 
pay. By taking advantage of the sick pay 
exclusion, you save $252 in social security 
and Medicare alone. This may not sound like 
much, but if your company is a corporation 
in the 48% tax bracket and its profit margin 
is 10% on sales before taxes, you would have 
to make sales totaling $4,846 to get $252 
profit after income taxes. As you can see, the 
savings can be substantial when sick pay 
of all employees earning less than the $6,600 
maximum, for F.I.C.A. and Medicare is con­
sidered.
Do not forget you would save on Federal 
and State unemployment taxes too on the 
employees who earn less than the payroll tax 
maximum.
When there is no definite plan, the only 
wages excluded from taxable wages will be 
those paid on account of sickness or accident 
after the expiration of six calendar months 
following the last month in which the em­
ployee worked for the paying employer.
Reference: Internal Revenue Code Sections 




Many taxpayers have been faced with the 
necessity of accepting adjustments to depre­
ciation when returns for years governed by the 
Cohn rule (Revenue Ruling 62-92) were ex­
amined. The adjustment consisted of a dis­
allowance of depreciation in the year of 
sale in the case of any asset sold at a gain. 
This rule apparently has been upset with the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Fribourg 
Navigation Co. Inc. v. Com., S. Ct., 3/7/66. 
Undoubtedly, protective claims have been 
filed pending the outcome of this decision, or 
if the statute is still open, the filing of such 
claims is presently contemplated. A word of 
caution on this score is in order, however.
The Fribourg Navigation case dealt with the 
purchase of a Liberty ship in 1955. Subsequent 
to its purchase, the taxpayer obtained a pri-
REVISITED
vate ruling from the Treasury Department to 
the effect that the remaining life of the vessel 
was three years, and proceeded to depreciate 
over this life. In 1957 due to the Suez Canal 
blockage the price of ships soared briefly and 
taxpayer sold the ship at a profit of $504,000. 
In the same year depreciation in the amount 
of $135,000 was claimed. This latter amount 
was disallowed as an expense by the Treasury 
Department under the Cohn rule. The Supreme 
Court found in favor of the taxpayer, indi­
cating that the gain and depreciation were un­
related. It held that depreciation was calculated 
on the useful life of the ship and that the sale 
at such a tremendous profit was not due to 
any error in estimating the life, but rather to 
a spectacular change in the world market 




Before filing claims for refund, the rationale 
of this decision must be carefully considered. 
In the decision the key phrase that practition­
ers should not overlook is “. . . the Commis­
sioner may require redetermination of useful 
life or salvage value when it becomes apparent 
that either of these factors has been mis­
calculated.” Under these circumstances it is 
obvious that in the case of a re-examination 
based on the Fribourg case taxpayer must 
be able to prove unequivocally that the gain 
arose solely from appreciation in value of 
the property, and not through incorrect esti­
mates of the life and salvage value.
An example of the type of situation that 
would meet the standards of the Fribourg case 
has occurred frequently in the past few years. 
Taxpayers who have been in business for 
thirty or forty years in a particular area and 
who have maintained an efficient repair and 
maintenance program may, for one reason or 
another, find it desirable to dispose of their 
plant. The selling price will in all probability 
reflect a tremendous appreciation in real es­
tate values, rather than incorrect depreciation 
in the past. If such is the case, the Fribourg, 
and not the Cohn rule would prevail.
In view of the recapture rules under Sec­
tion 1245 the Fribourg decision will be limited 
in its application with respect to machinery and 
equipment. In the case of the sale of buildings, 
however, the fairly nominal adjustment re­
quired under Section 1250 still leaves this 
type of asset vulnerable, and every effort 
should be made to accumulate evidence 
sufficient to overcome the Cohn rule.
D.L.B.
WATCH THOSE LOANS!
Two cases have come down recently which, 
although in unrelated areas, point out the 
necessity of establishing the validity of in­
debtedness in certain financial transactions. 
Both cases were decided in favor of the 
taxpayer but are notable in that they indicate 
a trend in Treasury Department thinking that 
must not be overlooked.
The first case, Seven Sixty Ranch Co. v. 
Kennedy, D. C. Wyo., 3/4/66 involved a 
Subchapter S corporation. The corporation 
gave its sole stockholder two notes in return 
for his taking over corporate loans with the 
banks. The amount of the bank loans assumed 
in excess of the amount of notes given to the 
stockholder were treated as donated surplus. 
The Treasury Department regarded these loans 
from the stockholders as a second class of 
stock and attempted to terminate Subchapter 
S status. The District Court decided in favor 
of the taxpayer and determined that the loans 
were in fact bona fide. In view of two pre­
vious decisions in this area that went against 
the taxpayer, however, and the necessity of 
litigating the present issue in the District 
Court, the safest rule would appear to be 
avoidance of indebtedness to a stockholder in 
a Subchapter S corporation.
The second case involving indebtedness 
represents the first time the Treasury Depart­
ment has challenged this type of transaction. 
It is particularly important because it is the 
type of transaction that normally occurs in 
many families. In Elizabeth Johnson v. U. S., 
D. C. Texas, 2/28/66 parents gave their 
children money in return for non-interest bear­
ing demand notes. At the time the case arose 
the notes had been almost completely repaid, 
but the Treasury Department attempted to 
impute taxable gifts annually to the extent 
of interest at 3-1/2%. The District Court 
indicated that, as yet, parents are not required 
to deal with children on a complete arm’s 
length basis to the extent that they must 
charge interest on any loans made to them. 
There was a recognition of a common practice 
to loan money to children to give them a start 
in life. The point to be borne in mind here 
is that the loans had been almost completely 
repaid and were therefore bona fide. In all 
similar transactions in the future it would 
seem taxpayers must be prepared to establish 
the validity of the loans if gift tax implications 
are to be avoided. D.L.B.
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